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Abstract
There has been much reported on decisions from experience, also re-
ferred to as decisions in a complete ignorance fashion. This note lays out
a Bayesian decision-theoretical framework that provides a computable ac-
count for decisions from experience. Tomake the frameworkmore tractable,
this note sets up and examines decisions in a incomplete ignorance fashion.
The current discussion asserts that well-known behavioural effects, such as
the hot stove effect, and the Bayesian framework may lead to different pre-
dictions.
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1 Introduction
The Bayesian decision-theoretical framework is useful to examine behavioural
tendencies in decisions under ambiguity. A concept of the Bayesian framework
is one of normative framework that are ubiquitously used by behaviourists to
provide a computable account for behavioural tendencies in “decisions from
experience”. It asserts that the Bayesian decision maker’s ultimate goal is to
judge the likelihood of events by updating her/his subjective probabilities in the
face of new evidence as a result of sequential search process (Fujikawa, 2007).
An area of decisions from experience (also referred to as “decisions in a com-
plete ignorance fashion”) is fast moving. Many research based on laboratory
experiments has been presented (e.g., Barron and Erev, 2003; Hertwig, Barron,
Weber, and Erev, 2004; Weber, Shaﬁr, and Blais, 2004; Erev and Barron, 2005;
Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2006; Fujikawa, 2009; Barron and Yechiam, 2009). For
example, Table 1 shows two choice problems from Fujikawa (2009), where the
participants chose, at each period t (t = 1, 2, . . . , 400), between two unmarked
buttons that provided outcomes sampled from two distributions, “R” and “S”.
Let (v, p) denote a distribution, where the outcome v occurs with probability p
(otherwise zero). The right hand column shows the aggregated proportion of R
choices over 400 trials. The maximisation rate over the 400 trials were 0.28 in
Problem 2, for example. This result suggested that deviations from maximisa-
tion (i.e., the participants’ less selection of R) in a state of “complete ignorance”
were the consequence of the hot stove effect that could lead to a bias toward
S. The existence of the hot stove effect in decisions from experience was exam-
ined by analysing results of Fujikawa’s (2009) experiment, involving the state of
complete ignorance.
The participants did not receive prior information on payoff structure, but
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Problem R S PR
1 (4, 0.8) (3, 1) 0.48
2 (32, 0.1) (3, 1) 0.22
Table 1: Three choice problems and aggregated proportion of R choices in Fu-
jikawa (2009). The notation (v, p) denotes a prospect that provides v with prob-
ability p and 0 otherwise.
received the feedback that was limited to obtained payoffs at each round t. That
is, the experiment was run on a state of complete ignorance, where they were
disclosed neither the possible payoffs nor its likelihoods. The apparatus in this
state, however, seems to have challenging in examining the existence of the hot
stove effect in light of the Bayesian framework that combines prior information
on payoff distributions with data to obtain a posterior estimate. The participants
in Fujikawa (2009) who were in the state of complete ignorance were likely to
fail to use Bayesian framework, as they were not provided with any prior infor-
mation on the payoff distributions.
This note extends Fujikawa (2009) by laying out the Bayesian decision-theoretical
framework that accounts for decisions from experience. Instead of a state of
complete ignorance employed by Fujikawa (2009), we shall employ in this note
a state of “incomplete ignorance” in which the decision makers (DMs) can ob-
tain posterior estimates calculated by the Bayesian framework. A state of in-
complete ignorance is deﬁned as one, where the DMs are disclosed possible
payoffs of available options, but not disclosed likelihood of the payoffs. Making
possible payoffs available to the participants could allow them to update data
through the Bayesian framework.
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2 A State of Complete Ignorance
We now deﬁne a state of complete ignorance as the state, where the DM’s prior
probability distribution (i.e., the distribution at t = 0) is uniform. A state of
complete ignorance was experimentally manipulated in previous studies on de-
cisions from experience given above. The authors used pairwise choice prob-
lems, such as the following Problem X:
Problem X. Choose between
AX: a points with probability of P¤AX ; 0 otherwise
BX: b points with probability of P¤BX ; 0 otherwise
We let a, b > 0, P¤AX , P
¤
BX 2 [0, 1], aP¤AX > bP¤BX . Typically, the DM is not pro-
vided any prior information on the payoff structure, and repeatedly asked to
make decisions, relying on the obtained feedback in the situation in the past.
Thus, it is unknown to the DM that one selection of AX (BX) yields a (b) points
with probability of P¤AX (P
¤
BX ) and zero point with 1¡ P¤AX (1¡ P¤BX ). It is, how-
ever, known to her that one selection of each option yields certain payoffs with
unknown probabilities. Suppose that the DM is asked to choose either AX or BX
t (0 · t · T) times in Problem X. Given that each of the mutually exclusive and
exhaustive outcomes x is equally likely, the prior probability distribution of AX
is
f0(x) =
8>><>>:
1
x1+1
for 0 · x · x1,
0 for x < 0 or x > x1.
In case of a state of complete ignorance, x1 may largely vary among the DMs,
as they do not have any prior information on possible outcomes and probabili-
ties. For example, some participants in Fujikawa (2009) were likely to have high
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x1, while others low x1. Thus, it seems that a prior probability distribution on
AX would largely vary among the participants.
3 A State of Incomplete Ignorance
We here aim at introducing the Bayesian framework to examine behavioural
tendencies in decisions from experience. For this aim, we here present a state of
incomplete ignorance that is concerned with the situation, where the DMs have
incomplete information on a payoff structure. Let us consider the following
Problem Y:
Problem Y. Choose between
AY: g points with probability of P¤AY ; 0 otherwise
BY: q points with probability of P¤BY ; 0 otherwise
We let g, q > 0, P¤AY , P
¤
BY
2 [0, 1]. The DM makes a choice between AY and BY
at each period t (t = 1, 2, . . . , T). She is informed of possible payoffs of each
option, but not informed of corresponding probabilities. That is, she knows that
one selection of AY (BY) yields g (q) points with an unknown probability. Thus,
the density function of her a priori formulated beliefs is
f (x) =
8>><>>:
0.5 if x = g or x = 0,
0 otherwise.
A goal of Bayesian DMs is to compute a posteriori probabilities from a priori
probabilities. Since the DM does not possess the available objective prior in-
formation on P¤AY , she is to compute a posteriori probabilities of P
¤
AY
from a priori
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probabilities of P¤AY , and her experienced probability Pexp. Below, we shall apply
a theoretical framework to the case of P¤AY , as the same argument holds for the
case of P¤BY . For computing the a posteriori probabilities, we consider the case of
n events: We deﬁne an event Rk (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) as an event that P¤AY falls within
region k ( k¡1n · P¤AY < kn ) at period t. Each Rk has a probability Pt(Rk) =
St(k)
n
that deﬁnes the likelihood of Rk. Each event is exclusive to the all of the other
events. Thus,
8x 2 1, 2, ..., n, 8y 2 1, 2, ..., n, x 6= y : Pt(Rx \ Ry) = 0. (1)
Note that
Pt(
n[
1
Rk) =
n
å
k=1
Pt(Rk) =
ånk=1 St(k)
n
= 1 (2)
as P¤AY belongs to one of the regions. For example, if n = 2, there are two possible
events that are R1 (0 · P¤AY < 0.5) and R2 (0.5 · P¤AY < 1), and their probabili-
ties are Pt(R1) =
St(1)
2 and Pt(R2) =
St(2)
2 . The P
¤
AY
belongs to either of the region,
so the sum of the probabilities is Pt(R1) + Pt(R2) = Pt(R1 [ R2) = 1. By deﬁ-
nition, we can calculate the probability of the event Pt+1(Wt+1) at period t+ 1,
where Wt+1 is an event that the highest payoff, g, being realised at the period
t + 1. To calculate the probability Pt+1(Wt+1), we separate it to Pt+1(Wt+1jRk)
when an event Rk occurs. From eq.(1) and eq.(2), we can calculate Pt+1(Wt+1) as
follows:
Pt+1(Wt+1) = Pt+1(Wt+1j
n[
1
Rk)
=
n
å
k=1
Pt+1(Wt+1jRk)Pt(Rk)
=
n
å
k=1
Pt+1(Wt+1jRk)St(k)n . (3)
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Now we estimate and calculate Pt+1(Wt+1jRk). We approximate this as fol-
lows:
Pt+1(Wt+1jRk) = 2k¡ 12n . (4)
Plugging this into eq.(3) gives
Pt+1(Wt+1) =
n
å
k=1
(2k¡ 1)St(k)
2n2
. (5)
Having observed the result of period t+ 1 sequence, the DM updates the pos-
sibility St(k)n of an event Rk by using the Bayesian framework. If an event Wt+1
occured, the possibility of an event Rk (i.e.,
St+1(k)
n ) is
St+1(k)
n
= Pt+1(RkjWt+1) =
Pt+1(Wt+1jRk)Pt(Rk)
Pt+1(Wt+1)
=
(2k¡ 1)
2n
St(k)
n
ånj=1
(2j¡ 1)St(j)
2n2
=
(2k¡ 1)St(k)
ånj=1(2j¡ 1)St(j)
. (6)
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If an eventWt+1 is not realised, the possibility of an event Rk (i.e.,
St+1(k)
n ) is
St+1(k)
n
= Pt+1(RkjWt+1) =
Pt+1(Wt+1jRk)Pt(Rk)
Pt+1(Wt+1)
=
(2n¡ 2k+ 1)
2n
St(k)
n
ånj=1
(2n¡ 2j+ 1)St(j)
2n2
=
(2n¡ 2k+ 1)St(k)
ånj=1(2n¡ 2j+ 1)St(j)
. (7)
Thus, the possibility of an event Rk (i.e.,
St+1(k)
n ) is
St+1(k)
n
=
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(2k¡ 1)St(k)
ånj=1(2j¡ 1)St(j)
if Wt+1 is realised
(2n¡ 2k+ 1)St(k)
ånj=1(2n¡ 2j+ 1)St(j)
ifWt+1 is realised.
(8)
Eq.(8) is discrete, and we apply it to continuous representations. By so doing,
we get
St+1(k) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
lim
n!¥
(2k¡ 1)St(k)
ånj=1(2j¡ 1)St(j)
1
n
if Wt+1 is realised
lim
n!¥
(2n¡ 2k+ 1)St(k)
ånj=1(2n¡ 2j+ 1)St(j)
1
n
ifWt+1 is realised.
(9)
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By using inﬁnity, we assume St(k)n to be a continuous probability distribu-
tion. Then, we deﬁne the continuous probability density function pt(x)with the
following properties:
lim
n!¥
Z k
n
0
pt(x)dx = limn!¥
k
å
j=0
pt
³
j
n
´
n
= lim
n!¥
k
å
j=0
St(j)
n
(10)
and
lim
n!¥
Z 1
k
n
pt(x)dx = limn!¥
n
å
j=k
pt
³
j
n
´
n
= lim
n!¥
n
å
j=k
St(j)
n
, (11)
where k = 1, 2, . . . , n, and x is the imaginary possibility of the P¤AY .
Thus, Eq.(9) is
pt+1
µ
k
n
¶
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
lim
n!¥
(2k¡ 1)
n
pt
³ k
n
´
ånj=1
(2j¡ 1)
n
pt
³ j
n
´ 1
n
ifWt+1 is realised
lim
n!¥
(2n¡ 2k+ 1)
n
pt
³ k
n
´
ånj=1
(2n¡ 2j+ 1)
n
pt
³ j
n
´ 1
n
ifWt+1 is realised.
(12)
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Then, we obtain
pt+1
µ
k
n
¶
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
lim
n!¥
k
n
pt
³ k
n
´
ånj=1
j
n
pt
³ j
n
´ 1
n
ifWt+1 is realised
lim
n!¥
0B@1¡ kn
1CA pt³ kn´
ånj=1
0B@1¡ jn
1CA pt³ jn´ 1n
ifWt+1 is realised.
(13)
From eq.(11), we have
pt+1(x) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
xpt(x)R 1
0 ypt(y)dy
ifWt+1 is realised
(1¡ x)pt(x)R 1
0 (1¡ y)pt(y)dy
ifWt+1 is realised.
(14)
As shown in eq.(11), pt(x) is a probability density of Pt(Rk), so that
Z 1
0
pt(x)dx = 1. (15)
Without losing much generality and accuracy, it can be said that the DMs are
updating the probability density pt(x) from experienced results. Simply put, we
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deﬁne
ft(x) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
fw(x) = x ifWt+1 is realised
fl(x) = 1¡ x ifWt+1 is realised.
(16)
Eq.(14) is transformed as
pt+1(x) =
ft(x)pt(x)R 1
0 ft(y)pt(y)dy
. (17)
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Eq.(17) holds true at any time period t, thus
pt+1(x) =
ft(x)pt(x)R 1
0 ft(y)pt(y)dy
=
ft(x)
ft¡1(x)pt¡1(x)R 1
0 ft¡1(z)pt¡1(z)dzR 1
0 ft(y)
ft¡1(y)pt¡1(y)R 1
0 ft¡1(z)pt¡1(z)dz
dy
=
ft(x) ft¡1(x)pt¡1(x)R 1
0 ft(y) ft¡1(y)pt¡1(y)dy
=
ft(x) ft¡1(x) ft¡2(x)pt¡2(x)R 1
0 ft(y) ft¡1(y) ft¡2(x)pt¡2(x)dy
...
=
ft(x) ft¡1(x) ft¡2(x) ft¡3(x).... f2(x) f1(x)p1(x)R 1
0 ft(y) ft¡1(y) ft¡2(x) ft¡3(x).... f2(x) f1(x)p1(x)dy
=
p1(x)Õtk=1 fk(x)R 1
0 p1(y)Õ
t
k=1 fk(y)dy
. (18)
Letting r be a total number of times of the highest payoff realised, we have
t
Õ
k=1
fk(x) = fw(x)r fl(x)(t¡r) = x(tPexp)(1¡ x)(t(1¡Pexp)). (19)
Finally, we obtain
pt+1(x) =
p1(x)x(tPexp)(1¡ x)(t(1¡Pexp))R 1
0 p1(y)y
(tPexp)(1¡ y)(t(1¡Pexp))dy
. (20)
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Figure 1: The process of probability dencity change in case of realisedWt+1 and
Wt+1. We label the axes: P¤AY on x-axis and pt(x) on y-axis.
Thus, pt+1(x) only depends on Pexp (i.e., the proportion of the highest payoff
realised) at period t and initial probability density of p1(x). If we assume the
initial probability density function has the constant value as p1(x) = 1 then
eq.(20) only depends on Pexp as
pt+1(x) =
x(tPexp)(1¡ x)(t(1¡Pexp))R 1
0 y
(tPexp)(1¡ y)(t(1¡Pexp))dy
. (21)
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Figure 2: The temporal development of population distribution in the case of
P¤AY = 0.5.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Figure 1 shows a process of the earlier stage: It shows how the probability den-
sity changes as a result of an alternative case in each trial. At period t = 1, there
is no prior information on the probability of the highest payoff, so that its den-
sity is constant as p1(x) = 1. After the decision is made at t = 1, the DM will
face either of the two events in choosing an option at t = 2: (1) an event that
the highest payoff is realised (i.e., an eventW2); (2) an event that the lowest pay-
off is realised (i.e., W2). If the highest payoff is realised, the probablity density
function is updated as p2(x) = 2x by the result. If, on the other hand, the lowest
payoff is realised, the probability density function is updated as p2(x) = 2¡ 2x
by the result. At t = 3, the following three cases are possible: ﬁrst, p3(x) = 3x2
if eventsW2 andW3 are realised. Second, p3(x) = 6x(1¡ x) if either of the two
conditions are met: (i) a condition that W2 and W3 are realised; (ii) a condition
thatW2 andW3 are realised. Third, p3(x) = 3(1¡ x)2 ifW2 andW3 are realised.
Figure 2 shows the earlier stage of the population histogram for the case
of P¤AY = 0.5. In this case, the population of the DMs are divided into two
symmetrical situations: (1) a situation, where the lucky DMs face an event W,
and (2) a situation, where the unlucky DMs face an event W. Stochastically
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Figure 3: The temporal development of population distribution in the case of
P¤AY = 0.1.
and approximately, the population is gathered to the center of the histogram,
predicting the probability density function as similar to Gaussian.
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows the earlier stage of the population his-
togram for the case of P¤AY = 0.1. In this case, the population of the DMs
are divided into the asymmetrical situation. Stochastically and approximately,
the population is gathered to Pexp = 0.1, predicting the the probability den-
sity function with its maximum value at x = 0.1. From these aspects, by using
the Bayesian framework, we can predict P¤AY intuitively by the mathematical
background without any previous information, and its coefﬁcient of conﬁdence
stochastically depends on its trial number which increases the value of it.
An attention is to be given to future laboratory experiments to show ro-
bustness of the Bayesian decision-theoretical framework developed in this note,
which could provide an alternative account for behavioural tendencies in deci-
sions from experience. For example, Fujikawa (2009) presented experiments on
decisions from experience, and discussed the existence of the hot stove effect,
the predictions of which are different from predictions implied by the Bayesian
framework. Future experimental work will help us document whether people
often make choices predicted by well-known behavioural effects (e.g., the hot
stove effect and payoff variability effect), or choices predicted by the Bayesian
15
framework.
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